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1. On July 22, 1981, an accident occurred in Rockbridge
County, Virginia involving two automobiles. One car was driven
by Al, who was alone at the time of the collision. The other car
was driven by Bonnie and also contained a passenger, Chuck. All
three persons were injured.
On July 20, 1983, Chuck's attorney filed a motion for judgment against both drivers, Bonnie and Al, in the Circuit Court of
the County of Rockbridge to recover for the injuries which Chuck
received in the adcident. Al was served with the motion for judgment on July 22nd and Bonnie was served on July 23rd.
Al's attorney filed a grounds of defense to the motion for
judgment on July 30, 1983, and simultaneously filed a cross-claim
against Bonnie, to recover for personal injuries sustained by Al
in the collision.
Bonnie's attorney filed grounds of defense to Chuck's motion·
for judgment on Auqust 7, 1983, and filed at the same time pleas
of the statute of.limitations to both the motion for judgment and
the cross-claim. She alleged tha~ both actions against-her were
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
How should the Court rule on Bonnie's pleas of the statute
of limitations? Why?
*

*

*

*

*

2. Charles is on trial for rape and robbery in the Circuit
Court of Craig County, Virginia. During voir dire proceedings, a
prospective juror, Herman, admits during lengthy questioning by
defense attorneys that he has read and heard extensive news accounts
of the;crimes of which the defendant is accused. When asked whether
he has formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, Herman answers: "I think it looks pretty bad for him.
From all of the information that has been given in the papers, and
it's gone through the Grand Jury, and I don't see how it would have
gotten to this point if there wasn't some guilt there." On further
questioning by the Court, Herman states that he understands that a
man is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty, that he has not
formed a fixed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Charles, and
that the fact that Charles is charged with rape would not have any
effect upon his ability to render a fair verdict.
How should the Court rule on a challenge for cause to the
seating of Herman as a juror?
*

*

*

*

*
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3. You have been appointed by the Judge of the Circuit
Court of the City of Roanoke, Virginia to defend John on charges
of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony. John
was apprehended by the police near the scene of the crime. He
was taken to the police station where he was fully advised of his
rights and signed a written confession.
At the trial, the written confession was properly introduced
into evidence by th~ Commonwealth's Attorney. John did not testify in his own behalf.
In his closing argument to the jury, the Commonwealth's
Attorney, Buzz Saw, refers to the written confession and then points
out to the jury that John did not testify in his own defense.
(a)

What action, if any, do you take, and when?

(b)

What should the trial judge do?
*

*

*

*

*

4. Clem Hayseed, an attorney, represents Bristol Tractor
Supply Corp., a Tennessee corporation, which has its only place of
business in Bristol, Tennessee. Bristol Tractor .. Supply Corp. sold
a tractor to Farmer Brown and delivered it to a farm which he owns
and where he lives in Smyth County, Virginia.
After using the tractor for a month, Farmer Brown goes to his
attorney, John Longfellow, and advises him that the tractor does
not perform satisfactorily and asks Longfellow to assist him in
recovering $15,000.00 which he paid to Bristol Tractor Supply to
apply toward the $30,000.00 purchase price.
Bristol' Tractor Supply contends that Brown's problems are of
his own making in that he is not properly operating the tractor,
·and it expects Brown to pay the balance of the purchase price.
Hayseed and Longfellow realize that the matter will not be
resolved without litigation.
(a) Which of the parties may bring an action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia?
(b) At a pretrial conference, the District Judge advises
Hayseed and Longfellow of a local rule which requires all cases to
be decided by six jurors. Is this rule permissible?
(c) Hayseed and Longfellow request that the case be submitted
to five jurors and advise the Court that they will accept a majority
verdict. Is this permissible?
*

*

*

*

*
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5. Ralph, who owns a 900 acre farm in Highland County, Virg1n1a, conveys a five (5) acre parcel thereof to Jim. The deed
described the parcel as bounded on the north by State Route 615,
on the east and west by third parties, and on the south by a 15
foot farm road, owned by Ralph, running from Ralph's barn out to
Primary Highway 19 near the Oak Grove Middle School, whlch Jim's
children attend. The deed makes no mention of Jim having any
r i gh t to u s e t he f a·r m r o a d . Aft e r J i m mo ve s i n to t he ne w home he
built on the 5 acres, he decides to use the farm road to take his
children to school rather than going the long way around on Route
615. Ralph, in a fit of anger, closes the farm road by building
a fence across it.
Jim files suit in the Circuit Court for the purpose of estab1 ishing his right to use the farm road and to compel Ralph to re-

move the fence and reopen the farm road.
Ralph responds that Jim has no interest in the farm road.
He asserts that Jim has access to the public highway (State Route
615), that he has no right to use the farm road, that it was referred to in the deed only for the purpose of describing the southern boundary line of Jim's parcel of land, and that no easement
over the farm road was granted to Jim in the deed. He also argues
that the road is his property and if he had meant to give Jim an
easement over it, he would have done so in the deed.
Who is correct, Jim or Ralph?

* * * * *
6. Fred Friendly secured judgment against Norman Nuxall in
1965 for $25,000.00, which he immediately docketed in the Office
of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, Virginia.
·on Joly 10, 1975, Nuxall sold his family farm lo~ated near Claypool Hill in, Tazewell County to Ben Gorbus for fair market value
by general warranty deed, which was duly recorded the same day
in the aforesaid Clerk's Office.
In 1984, shortly after the death of Nuxall, from whom Friendly
had been unable to collect the debt after numerous attempts, Friendly
demanded payment of his judgment, plus the interest and costs, from
Gorbus, who promptly refused to pay. Friendly then filed a Bill of·
Complaint in equity and a notice of li~ pendens, joining the proper
parties, in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, Virginia, seeking
to enforce the lien of his judgment against the real estate Gorbus
had bought from Nuxall.
Gorbus c9mes to your office and retains you to represent him.
You consider filing a plea of laches on the basis that this is a
suit in equity. You also consider filing a plea of the statute of
limitations.
(a)

Would a plea of laches be sustained in this case?

( b ) Would a plea of statute of limitations be-sustained in
this case?

* *

* * *
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7. Counsel for Walnut Lumber Company files a Bill of Complaint in the Circuit Court of Bath County seeking an injunction
against Solomon Osborne, a former salesman, who now works for a
competitor and is dealing with many of Walnut's customers. He
attaches to his complaint a written employment contract in which
Osborne agreed that should his employment be terminated_for any
reason, he would not seek employment with any competitor of Walnut
within a twenty-five mile area of Walnut's place of business for a
period of two years.
Osborne answers the complaint and admits the contract and
that he now works for a competitor within the restricted area. He
alleges, however, that Walnut had no basis to terminate his employment and had requested that he resign. Reciting his need to support his family, Osborne further alleges that as a condition to his
agreement to resign, Tom Pine, president of Walnut, agreed to waive
the restrictive covenant in the employment contract and to permit
Osborne to go back to work with the company where he started his
career, notwithstanding the fact that such employment would be
contrary to the provisions of the employment agreement upon which
Walnut relies. It appears clear that the question whether there
was an oral waiver as contended by Osborne will turn on the credibility of the expected testimony of Pine and Osborne.
Along with his answer, Osborne's attorney files a written
motion supported by an affidavit requesting that the matter in. controversy be submitted to a jury. Walnut's counsel files a written
reply to the motion in which he asserts that there is no basis for
a jury trial in the cause. ~He asserts that equity practice in Virginia does not contemplate the use of lay jurors to determine matters which are properly for the Chancellor alone. He attaches to
his reply the affidavit of Tom Pine who says that he told Osborne
that approval of his future employment with a competitor within the
two year period would require the vote of the board of directors,
which never took place.
The trial judge has turned to you as his law clerk and asks
you whether under the facts recited, there should be a jury trial
in this suit, and if so, would it determine the outcome?

* * *

* *

8. Harvey Sturgill, a 98 year old widower and sometime land
speculator, lived in the samll town of Raven, Virginia. He was
eccentftc, but of sound mind. Having read about the earthquake
situation in California, Sturgill became convinced that present
Nevada desert land would soon become prime beachfront property.
Ru s h i n g to ta k' e adv an ta ge o f th i s de a 1 , St u r g i 1 1 em p 1oye d James
A. Tonto for $2,500.00 to go to Nevada and buy up as much desert
as was available for $200,000.00. For convenience, Sturgill gave
Tonto a signed blank check drawn on Sturgil1 's account at the
"Bank of Raven" and a written power of attorney setting forth the
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purposes, terms and conditions of Tonto s employment, including
the power to fill in the check appropriately for a purchase.
1

After Tonto left for Nevada, Sturgill died of old age. On
the day after Sturgill 's death, but before Tonto learned of it,
Tonto paid the sum of $200,000.00 for desert land using the check
drawn o n S t u r g i l l 1 s a c co u n t . A1 t ho u g h e v e r yo n e a t t he · 11 .B a n k o f
Raven" knew of Stur.gill 's demise, the Bank nonetheless honored
the $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 . O0 ch e·c k seven days after Stu r g i l 1 s death am i d many
humorous comments about Sturgill 's foolhardy attempt to own prime
beachfront property.
1

Sturgill 's only daughter, Jezebel, is now attempting to void
the purchase of the Nevada property and get the $200,000.00 back
into Sturgill 's estate. In pursuing this quest, the following
issues arise:
(1) Did Tonto's actions in buying the Nevada property bind
Sturgill's estate?
check?

(2)

Did the "Bank of Raven" properly honor the $200,000.00

How would you resolve these two issues?

* * * * *
9. John Quigly operated an automobile dealership in Hampton,
Virginia. When he purchased cars from the manufacturer he paid for
them with funds obtained under a line of credit with Convenient
National Bank located in Hampton and put them on his lot for sale.
For each car that he bought he would obtain a certificate of title
from the Division of Motor Vehicles and the certificate would
show a lien in favor of Convenient National Bank in the amount
loaned on that car. When Quigly sold the car he would pay off the
Bank and obtain a new certificate of tile for the purchaser who
was not advised of Quigly's financing arrangements. This arrangement was well understood by the Bank and worked very well for a
number of years.
During 1982, times were not the best in the automobile world
and Quigly was struggling to survive. Accordingly, he was unusually pleased to sell one of his top-of-the-line cars, fully loaded
with conveniences, to Herman Hamilton. Hamilton paid cash for the
car. Quigly gave him a receipt for his cash, a bill of sale, and
had him fill in an application for title to be filed with the
Division of Motor Vehicles. Quigly told Hamilton his title would
be forwarded i.n about a week. Hamilton happily drove away.
Quigly was pressed by other obligations and sent the money
given him by Hamilton to Roger Realtor, his landlord, to bring
his rent payments up to date.
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Within the next week, CoRvenient National Bank learned of
the sale to Hamilton and ~ade demand on Quigly for the amount of
its lien. When Quigly didn't make the payment, the Bank visited
Hamilton and requested delivery of the car or payment of the
Bank's lien. Hamilton refused to do either one, contending he
had paid in full for the car and was entitled to keep it. The
Bank explained that it had a duly recorded lien on the car and
Hamilton was charged with notice of that lien and had to surrender
the car. Who was ~orrect, Hamilton, or the Bank?

* * * * *
10. On April 3, 1979, Matilda filed a bill for divorce
against her- husband Chesterfield in the Circuit Court of the City
of Roanoke, Virginia on t~e grounds of cruelty .. After the Bill
of Complaint was served Chesterfield and his attorney met with
Matilda and her counsel, and the parties negotiated a Property
Settlement and Support Agreement which was signed by Chesterfield
and Matilda. Under the agreement Matilda received the family residence and an automobile, and Chesterfield was obligated to pay her
the sum of $1,500.00 per month in lieu of alimony. A final decree
was entered on September 15, 1979 in which the Court granted a
final divorce to Matilda, awarded her custody of their son, Michael,
and ordered Chesterfield to pay Matilda the sum of $500.00 a month
as support for Michael. The decree made ~o mention of support
payments to Matilda, but it did approve the Property Settlement
and Support Agreement in the following language:
"Further Decreed, that the property settlement contract or agreement made between the parties here~o
on the 16th day of June, 1979, a copy of which agreement is attached hereto, is hereby confirmed by this
Court and is made a part of this decree, and the
parties hereto shall hereafter have no property
rights ~r interest in the property of each. other,
real or personal, now held or hereafter acquired,
or any rights or duties of support and maintenance,
except as provided in the said property settlement
agreement."
During 1981 and 1982 Chesterfield's stock brokerage business
encountered hard times and on October 10, 1982 he persuaded Matilda
to accept the sum of $750.00 as her monthly support payment. These
reduced payments continued for a year. In October of 1983 Matilda
found herself strapped by the reduced income and asked Chesterfield
to restore the original level of payments. She also asked him to
increase the monthly payments for her son. In doing so she recited
her own needs,, the fact that Mi cha el needed extensive dental work
and contended that the cost of his education had increased substantially.
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Chesterfield refused to make any increased payments even
though his business was then prospering, contending that Matilda
had agreed to the reduction in the level of support payments and
was bound by her acquiescence. Matilda then filed a petition
in the chancery cause in which she had been granted a divorce,
thus reopening that case, praying that Chesterfield be ordered
to pay her all of the arrearage due under the court approv~d
Agreement, that he~ spousal support be increased to $2,000.00.
a month and that she be paid $1 ,000.00 a month for child support.
She further prayed that Chesterfield be __ held in contempt for
f~iling to keep up the spousal su~port payments in accordance
with the original agreement.
Assuming that Matilda made a strong showing of necessity
in each ins~ance and demonstrated that th~ current vigor of
Chesterfield's business enabled him to make such payments, how
should the Court rule on: (a) the arreafages, (b) the request
for spousal support, (c) the request for an increase in child
support, and (d) the request to hold Chesterfield in contempt?

